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Introduction
On the dishonour of a negotiable instrument,1 whether a bill of
exchange ("bill") 2 or a promissory note ("note"), 3 given by an
obligor 4 in payment under a basic transaction, 5 the holder 6 may
" Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. Presently Visiting
Associate Professor of Law at University of Illinois, at Urbana-Champaign.
I In this article, "negotiable instruments" (or "instruments") are bills or notes (see
footnotes 2-3, infra) governed by the Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-5, as
amended by R.S.C. 1970, c. 4 (1st. Supp.), s. 1, or Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (U.K.),
c. 61 (hereafter "Can." or "U.K.", respectively). "Dishonour" of an instrument is either
by non-acceptance (Can., s. 81; U.K., s. 43) or by non-payment (Can., s. 95; U.K., s.
47).
2 "A bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing, addressed by one person to
another, signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to
pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to or
to the order of a specified person, or to bearer": Can., s. 17(1); U.K., s. 3(1).
3 "A promissory note is an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to
another, signed by the maker, engaging to pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable
future time, a sum certain in money, to, or to the order of, a specified person, or to
bearer": Can., s. 176(1); U.K., s. 83(1).
4 The obligor under the basic transaction may be the drawer of a bill (i.e., the person who
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maintain his action for payment on the instrument itself. 7 The
power of the obligor 8 to assert defences arising from breach of the
underlying contract 9 depends then first on whether the plaintiff is
a holder not in due course.I° It may further depend on the type of
defences involved. 1t This article examines the proposition that
under Anglo-Canadian law an obligor sued on the instrument by
a holder not in due course, can assert all defences available in an
action on the underlying contract. 12 He does not have to pursue
gives the order thereon (cf. Can., s. 35(1); U.K., s. 17(1))), the maker of a note (i.e., the
promissor thereunder, supra, footnote 3), or the acceptor of a bill (cf. Can., s. 35(1);
U.K., s. 17(1)) drawn on him by the creditor. Most typically, in the context of the sale of
goods, he will be the drawer of a bill (usually a cheque as defined in Can., s. 165(1);
U.K., s. 73) in a cash retail transaction, the maker of a note in a credit retail transaction
or the acceptor of a bill in a documentary sale between distant parties.
5 "Where a bill or note is given by way of payment, the payment may be absolute or condi-
tional, the strong presumption being in favour of conditional payment": Chalmers on
Bills of Exchange, 13th ed., D. Smout, ed. (London, Stevens & Sons, 1964), p. 338. See
also Falconbridge on Banking and Bills of Exchange, 7th ed., A. W. Rogers, ed.
(Toronto, Canada Law Book Ltd., 1969), p. 798; A. Barak "The Uniform Commercial
Code - Commercial Paper: An Outsider's View", Part II, 3 Is. L. Rev. 184 (1968), at p.
214; F. Kessler, E. H. Levi and E. E. Ferguson, "Some Aspects of Payment by
Negotiable Instrument: A Comparative Study", 45 Yale L.J. 1373 (1935-36), at p. 1374.
6 "Holder, is "the payee or endorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it, or the
bearer thereof": Can., s. 2; U.K., s. 2.
7 Alternatively, the holder may sue on the underlying contract (see authorities cited in
footnote 5, supra), in which case the availability of the obligor's defences is well
established.
8 This article is concerned only with the action on the instrument against the party
primarily liable under the basic transaction (cf. footnote 4, supra). The availability of his
defences in an action on the instrument against another party liable thereon (an
endorser) is outside the ambit of this article. For the right of the holder and ius tertii, see
A. Barak, "The Uniform Commercial Code - Commercial Paper: An Outsider's
View", Part 1, 3 Is. L. Rev. 7 (1968), at p. 21.
9 "Underlying contract", and "basic transaction" (text at footnote 5, supra) are
interchangeable.
10 "A holder not in due course is a holder who has taken a bill, complete and regular on
the face of it, under the following conditions, namely:
(a) that he became the holder of it before it was overdue and without notice that
it had been previously dishonoured, if such was the fact;
(b) that he took the bill in good faith and for value, and that at the time the bill
was negotiated to him he had no notice of any defect in the title of the person
who negotiated it": Can., s. 56(1); U.K., s. 29(1).
In this article, "holder not in due course" denotes every holder (footnote 6, supra) who
is not a holder in due course. This can be the payee (an "immediate party", footnote 24,
infra) as well as a subsequent transferee who does not take the instrument in the condi-
tions prescribed in Can., s. 56(1); U.K., s. 29(1) (a "remote party", footnote 26, infra).
tt Falconbridge, supra, footnote 5, at p. 665.
12 Such a rule, missing from the Act, is explicitly provided for in the American Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC") (1962 as well as 1972 Official Text). See UCC 3-306 and 3-
408 set out in Appendix 2; cf. Part IV, infra.
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his remedies in a separate action against the party in breach. The
focus of the article is on the general theory underlying negotiable
instruments and the liability thereon. Part I outlines the statutory
scheme governing the rights of a holder not in due course in light
of applicable policy considerations. Part II presents the concept
of "defect of title" as central to the delineation of defences
available against a holder not in due course. The discussion sets
forth the division of "defect of title" into "equities as to owner-
ship" and "equities as to liability" and closely examines the scope
of the latter. It concludes that all contractual defences, as distin-
guished from counterclaims and set-offs arising from separate
transactions, are "equities as to liability". Part III establishes the
applicability of this analysis to the unilateral contract under a
negotiable instrument. Part IV challenges the traditional
summary as to the scope of the defence of failure of consideration
and supports the proposition that failure of consideration (the
defence of breach of contract) is an equity as to liability on a bill
or note available against a holder not in due course. 13 The
concluding part of this article is the plea for a statutory clarifying
amendment designed to restate the basic proposition that a
holder not in due course holds the instrument subject to all
defences available in an action on the underlying contract.
The following example will facilitate the understanding of the
problem explored in this article. A negotiable instrument is
issued by a buyer to the order of a seller in return for two
machines sold to him. The seller breaks the contract. His breach
could take different forms. He can fail altogether to deliver the
machines (total failure of consideration), he can fail to deliver
one of the two machines (partial failure of consideration in an
ascertained or liquidated amount), or while having provided both
machines, he can be in breach of a warranty with respect to them
(partial failure of consideration in a sum uncertain). The
instrument either remains in the hands of the seller (the
immediate party) or is negotiated by him to a finance company (a
remote party) which, for one reason or another, fails to be a
holder in due course. In either case the buyer is sued on the
instrument by a holder not in due course. Having failed or chosen
not to rescind or terminate the contract, or being not entitled to
13 Discussion of the defence of absence of consideration would also be appropriate. Due to
space limitations I chose not to deal with it in the framework of the present article.
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exercise this remedy in the first place, can the buyer assert his
defences arising from the seller's breach in an action on the
instrument? Stated otherwise, the issue is the buyer's ability to
avoid circuity of actions as well as the risk of ultimately incurring
loss, namely his power to litigate his liability in the action on the
instrument instead of in a separate action brought by him after
having been forced to pay the full amount of the instrument. The
answer ultimately given in this article is that every defence arising
from the seller's breach can be raised against every holder not in
due course. Depending on the size of the damage caused by the
breach, the effect of such defence is either to extinguish or to
diminish the recovery on the instrument.
I. The Statutory Scheme Under the Bills of Exchange Actl3a
The Bills of Exchange Act, in the United Kingdom as well as in
Canada 14 and other Commonwealth jurisdictions 15 ("the Act"),
explicitly provides that a holder in due course of a negotiable
instrument 16 holds it free from "any defect of title of prior parties,
as well as from mere personal defences available to prior parties
among themselves". 17 In contrast, as regards defences available
against a holder not in due course, the Act contains no compre-
hensive rule, but rather provides only for two specific situations.
Thus, an overdue instrument "can be negotiated only subject to
any defect of title affecting it at its maturity". 18 Likewise, any
person who takes a dishonoured instrument "that is not overdue"
13a The principal provisions of the Act are reproduced in Appendix 1. Note also the UCC
provisions reproduced in Appendix 2 for comparison and a possible direction for legis-
lative reform.
14 Both cited in footnote 1, supra. The Canadian Act is "the adoption ... with some
modification" of the U.K. Act, Falconbridge, supra, footnote 5, p. 425. The differences
between the two statutes which are applicable to the subject-matter of this article are
analyzed in footnotes 30-52 and text, infra.
15 For a complete list of jurisdictions which have adopted a statute modelled on the Act,
see Falconbridge, supra, footnote 5, pp. 431-2.
16 The provisions dealing with rights of the holder or the holder in due course referred only
to bills of exchange. None the less, "the provisions of [the] Act relating to bills of
exchange apply, with the necessary modifications, to promissory notes": Can., s.
186(1); U.K., s. 89(1).
17 Can., s. 74(b); U.K., s. 38(2) (emphasis added). The implication from this provision is
that "real defences", i.e., those "based upon the nullity of the res" are available also
against a holder in due course: Falconbridge, supra, footnote 5, p. 688. Examples of real
defences are absolute incapacity, forgery, or non estfactum: Falconbridge, pp. 668 and
672.
18 Can., s. 70(1); U.K., s. 36(2) (emphasis added).
(Vol. 5
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with notice of the dishonour takes it "subject to any defect of title
attaching thereto at the time of dishonour". 19
Besides its silence on the rights of a holder not in due course in
other situations, the Act does not specify the entire scope of
"defect of title". 20 Its provisions are further neutral as to the
delineation of "mere personal defences available to prior parties
among themselves". This neutrality also extends to the effect of
''mere personal defences" on the rights of a holder of an overdue
instrument as well as of one who takes a dishonoured instrument
"that is not overdue" with notice of the dishonour. 21 Indeed, the
Act's treatment of the subject is not at all clear or comprehensive.
Policy considerations support the obligor's power to assert all
his contractual defences against every holder not in due course. 22
This power results in avoiding circuity of actions: rather than first
paying in the action on the instrument and then pursuing his
remedies in a separate action, the obligor is able to litigate his
liability immediately in the action on the instrument. 23 Also, the
absence of power to assert his defences in the action on the
instrument is bound to leave the obligor with remedies only
against his immediate party (the party in breach). It may thus
confer on a remote party24 an absolute right to payment even
when he is not a holder in due course. 25
In so far as standard form contracts are concerned, the
obligor's power to assert his defences is further consistent with
optimality principles. 26 Thus, a creditor under a standard form
19 Can., s. 72; U.K., s. 36(5) (emphasis added).
20 Some examples are enumerated in Can., s. 56(2); U.K., s. 29(2), see Appendix 1, infra.
21 Cf. footnotes 17-19 and text, supra.
22 Cf. Cowen on the Law of Negotiable Instruments in South Africa, 4th ed., Cowen and
Gering, eds. (Cape Town, Juta, 1966), p. 271: "a holder who fails to qualify as a holder
in due course should in principle be in the position of an ordinary [assignee] of a
contractual claim". (The word "cessonary" is used in the text in lieu of "assignee". The
former, in South African law, corresponds to the latter in English law; Cowen, ibid., at
p. 6 and note 24.) The position of an assignee is set forth in footnotes 72-81 and text,
footnotes 91-102 and text, footnote 111 and text, infra. Whether policy considerations
support the obligor's power to assert his defences also against a holder in due course is
not within the scope of the present article.
23 Cf. footnotes 197-8 and text, infra.
24 Parties are "immediate" or "remote" in relation to their own dealings underlying the
instrument. On a promissory note issued by a buyer to the order of a seller of goods and
subsequently discounted with a finance company, the maker-buyer and the payee-seller
are immediate parties, the maker-buyer and the endorsee-finance company are remote
parties, and the payee-seller and the endorsee-finance company are immediate parties.
25 Cf. footnotes 186-90 and text which follows, infra.
26 Cf. A. Schwartz, "Optimality and the Cut-off of Defenses Against Financers of
1980-81]
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contract (typically the seller of goods or his financing assignee) is
likely to estimate the risk stemming from the withholding of
payments by the aggregate of obligors on bills or notes27 more
accurately than an obligor is likely to evaluate the risk of
incurring loss by being obliged to pay notwithstanding his
defences. 28 The price structure of sellers using mass contracts is
therefore likely to reflect better all costs when the obligor has the
power to assert his defences, than when he lacks this power. As
the optimal allocation of resources is conditioned on the
reflection of all costs of an item in its price, optimality is
encouraged by the availability of all defences arising from the
underlying contract. Finally, creditor's reliance on absolute
payment does not outweigh debtor's reliance on absolute
performance. The former should not take precedence unless fully
negotiated and agreed between two parties of equal bargaining
power. 29
The treatment given under the Canadian Act30 to holders of
two classes of instruments purports to respond to these policy
considerations. First, a bill or note "the consideration of which
consists, in whole or in part, of the purchase money of a patent
right [must bear] prominently and legibly ... the words Given for
a patent right".31 Its "endorsee or other transferee" 32 takes it
under s. 15 "subject to any defence or set-off in respect of the
whole or any part thereof that would have existed between the
original parties". 33
The scope of s. 15 depends on the meaning of its key terms. As
Consumer Sales", 15 B.C. Ind. and Com. L. Rev. 499 (1973-74).
27 This risk being, the unjustified withholding of payments.
28 The latter is at least the loss of the "earning differential", i.e., the difference between
what the obligor could earn with the payments so made less the legal interest on those
amounts when recovered in a separate action: Schwartz, supra, footnote 26, at pp.
504-5.
29 But cf. footnotes 225-30 and text, infra.
30 These two exceptions are not provided for under the U.K. Act (but cf. footnote 47,
infra).
31 Can., s. 14(1). The marking has to be made "before [the instrument] is issued", ibid.
The section applies also to an instrument "the consideration of which consists, in whole
or in part ... of a partial interest, limited geographically or otherwise, in a patent right".
32 The provision thus applies only to a remote party (cf. footnotes 164-78 and text, infra).
33 Can., ss. 14-16 originate from an 1884 statute, "An Act for the better prevention of
Fraud in connection with the Sale of Patent Rights", S.C. 1884, c. 38, and see Falcon-
bridge, supra, footnote 5, p. 459, where it is none the less suggested these sections
should be repealed as "it is not clear why instruments given for a patent right should be
treated in an exceptional manner".
[Vol. 5
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" 'defence' includes counterclaim" 34 some confusion may arise.
Thus, according to Falconbridge, "claim and counterclaims are
merely independent cross-claims made by the plaintiff and the
defendant respectively in the same action". 35 A counterclaim may
arise under, but is not confined to, matters arising from the plain-
tiff's action. It "is the assertion by the defendant of a demand
which does not answer or destroy the plaintiff's claim". 35a It is
unlikely, however, that "defence" in the context of s. 15 encom-
passes counterclaims arising outside the underlying transaction. 36
At the same time, the right of "set-off" to which the holder is
explicitly made subject under s. 15 relates to a separate
transaction. 37 Its assertion reduces the amount recovered under
the plaintiff's claim in whole or in part. 38 The over-all effect of s.
15 under this construction is to put a remote party39 holder of an
instrument governed thereby40 in the same position as an assignee
of the underlying contract. 4'
The second class of instruments whose holder appears to be
exempted from the incomprehensive coverage of the statutory
scheme is governed by Part V of the Canadian Act. 42 A bill or
note issued by a buyer of consumer goods or services 43 ("con-
34 Under Can., s. 2. There is no corresponding clause in the U.K. Act. The meaning of this
definition should be understood in light of footnotes 73-81 and text, infra, cf. footnotes
186-92 and text, infra.
35 Falconbridge, supra, footnote 5, p. 437.
35a Ibid.
36 Cf. footnotes 73-89 and text, infra.
37 For this meaning of "set-off', see Falconbridge, supra, footnote 5, p. 671. Had "set-
off' in s. 15 related either to a failure of consideration expressed in an ascertained and
liquidated amount under the basic transaction itself, or to "equitable set-off" (cf.
footnote 202 and text, infra), the reference would have been superfluous.
38 Falconbridge, supra, foonote 5, p. 437. The exact language of Falconbridge is that "a
set-off is by its nature a defence ... [It] may have the effect of extinguishing the plain-
tiffs claim in whole or in part". Yet, the characterization of set-off as a "defence" as
well as its "extinguishing" effect will substantially be modified in footnotes 84-126 and
text, infra. In particular see footnotes 104-8 and text, and footnote 124, infra.
39 See footnote 24, supra.
40 Rights of an immediate party are not governed by s. 15; see footnote 32 and text, supra.
41 See Part II, "Defect of Title" ... , infra.
42 As enacted by R.S.C. 1970, c. 4 (1st Supp.), s. 1. Part V contains ss. 188-92. Like Can.,
s. 15, it does not have a counterpart in the U.K. Act. But cf. footnote 47, infra.
43 "Consumer purchase" is defined in s. 188 as:
... a purchase, other than a cash purchase, of goods or services or an agreement to
purchase goods or services
(a) by an individual other than for resale or for use in the course of his
business, profession or calling, and
1980-81]
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sumer bill" 44 or "consumer note ' 45 ) is required thereunder to
"be prominently and legibly marked on its face with the words
'Consumer Purchase' ".46 Under s. 191, the right of its holder "to
have the whole or any part thereof paid by the purchaser ... is
subject to any defence or right of set-off, other than counter-
claim, that the purchaser would have had in an action by the
seller on the consumer bill or consumer note". 47
The exclusion of "counterclaim" side by side with the inclusion
of "set-off' in s. 191 is probably designed to make clear that apart
from the right of "set-off', a cross-claim arising out of a separate
matter 48 with the seller cannot be asserted by way of defence
against an action of a remote party on the instrument. 49 This
results in avoiding the confusion mentioned above with respect to
s. 15.50 None the less, unlike s. 15, s. 191 does not turn out to be
(b) from a person who is engaged in the business of selling or providing
those goods or services.
A critical examination of some case law dealing with this definition can be found in my
comment in 3 C.B.L.J. 90 (1978-79), at p. 94.
44 Can., s. 189, provides in part:
189(1) A consumer bill is a bill of exchange
(a) issued in respect of a consumer purchase, and
(b) on which the purchaser... is liable as a party.
It does not include, however, a cheque apart from a cheque post-dated more than 30
days at the time of issue.
45 Under Can., s. 189(2),
(2) A consumer note is a promissory note
(a) issued in respect of a consumer purchase, and
(b) on which the purchaser... is liable as a party.
46 Can., s. 190(1). The marking has to be made "before or at the time when the instrument
is signed by the purchaser".
47 Substantially the same result will be accomplished in the U.K. under the Consumer
Credit Act, 1974 (U.K.), c. 39 where ss. 123-5 (no commencement date at time of publi-
cation) prohibit the taking of negotiable instruments in consumer transactions and deny
a holder in due course status to one who takes an instrument in contravention of the
prohibition.
48 The nature of set-off as a cross-claim is set forth in footnote 108 and text, supra.
49 Other interpretations appear unacceptable. Thus, the exclusion of "counterclaim" in s.
191 could have read as exempting a remote party from affirmative liability towards the
buyer for the seller's breach. This would state the obvious and as such would be super-
fluous. Cf. footnote 81 and text, infra. Alternatively, the exclusion of "counterclaim"
could have referred to defences giving rise to a counterclaim for unliquidated damages,
as for instance under breach of warranty. This would limit the exposure of the holder to
a failure of consideration expressed in an ascertained and liquidated amount (cf. text
that follows footnote 164, infra). This construction stands on a tenuous footing. Identi-
fying "counterclaim" in s. 191 with a counterclaim for unliquidated damages puts a
great strain on the language of the section.
50 See footnotes 34-6 and text, supra. In enacting Part V, Parliament followed the Can., s.
[Vol. 5
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an exception to the incomprehensiveness of the Act. The availa-
bility of defences against the holder of a consumer bill or note is
not dependent under s. 191 only on the scope of "any defence or
right of set-off, other than counter-claim". The holder's exposure
is further limited thereunder to defences that "the purchaser
would have had in an action by the seller on the consumer bill or
consumer note". 51 As our inquiry is directed at finding what
defences are available against an action of a holder not in due
course suing on a bill or note, this is rather unhelpful language.
Apart from putting a remote party on the same footing as an
immediate one ,52 it falls short of delineating the defences appli-
cable to an action or a consumer bill or consumer note.
It appears then that the model proposition as to the subjection
of the right of a holder not in due course to all defences available
on the underlying contract, while supported by sound policies, is
reflected only in s. 15 of the Canadian Act which governs the
rights of a remote party not a holder in due course of an
instrument properly marked as given for a patent right. The
proposition was also intended to have been adopted in Part V of
the Canadian Act with respect to bills and notes issued by buyers
of consumer goods or services. Apart from this, the delineation of
defences available against a holder not in due course is not
explicitly provided for in the Act and requires further analysis.
II. "Defect of Title" and Contractual Defences
Prima facie, the obligor's contractual defences fall within either
"defect of title" or "mere personal defences". This stems from
the scheme governing the position of a holder in due course
towards the obligor's defences. Thus, it is well established,
beyond the need to cite any supporting authority, that the
obligor's contractual defences are not available against a holder
in due course. The range of defences which are not available
against a holder in due course is delineated in the Act by the
15 model, see J. S. Ziegel, "Consumer Notes - Bill C-208 - Bills of Exchange
Amendment Act", 49 Can. Bar. Rev. 121 (1971), at p. 121 and note 8.
51 See footnote 47 and text, supra, emphasis added. The phrase "on the consumer bill or
consumer note" should either be replaced with "on the consumer purchase" or omitted
altogether.
52 Cf. footnotes 164-78 and text, infra. Note, however, that the effect of Part V of the
Canadian Act is not to make a remote party liable on the instrument: cf. footnotes 186-
92 and text, infra.
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categories of "defect of title" and "mere personal defences". 53
The obligor's defences must therefore fall within the territory
covered by these expressions. 53a
Further examination reveals that in dealing with the availability
of the obligor's defences against a holder not in due course, the
critical expression is "defect of title". As already mentioned, in
providing for two specific situations of a holder not in due course,
the Act omits any reference to "mere personal defences" and is
explicit with respect to the holder's subjection only to "any defect
of title". 54 The consensus among the majority of textbook
writers55 is accordingly that "whereas neither 'defect of title' nor
'mere personal defences' may be raised against a holder in due
course, defects of title may be raised against a remote party who
is not a holder in due course, but 'mere personal ... defences' are
not available against such a holder". 56 "A mere personal
defence" is good only "as between the two parties between whom
it arises, that is, between immediate parties". 57 Implicit in this
summary is the subjection of an immediate party to his own
defect of title. Thus, it is only "defect of title" which is central to
the delineation of defences available against all holders not in due
course. Whether the obligor's contractual defences do fall within
its ambit will now be examined.
The term "defect of title" was introduced into the Act as the
statutory equivalent of the common law expression "equity
53 Can., s. 74(b); U.K., s. 38(2); see footnotes 17 and text, supra.
53a As Can., s. 74; U.K., s. 38, is far from being an adequate statement (for example, it
fails to state the validity of real defences against a holder in due course: Falconbridge,
supra, footnote 5, p. 666), there is also the possibility that contractual defences are
neither "defect of title" nor "mere personal defences" and that their invalidity against
a holder in due course is established by a principle external to the explicit provisions of
the Act. As the present discussion concludes that contractual defences are "defects of
title", this possibility is not pursued.
54 See footnotes 18-19 and text, supra. The two specific situations are the holder of an
overdue instrument and the holder of a dishonoured instrument with notice of the
dishonour.
55 But cf. Byles on Bills of Exchange, 23rd ed., M. Megrah and F. R. Ryder, eds.
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1972), p. 190, "It would seem to be implied [by Can., s. 74;
U.K., s. 38] that the rights of any holder other than in due course must be less than
absolute and it would follow that he would be subject to defects of title in or mere
personal defences of prior parties" (emphasis added). This proposition is qualified later:
if the transferee is not a holder in due course "any defect of title may be set up against
him, but not a mere personal defence, unless it is a defence which the defendant could
set up against the transferor to the ultimate transferee" (ibid., p. 195, emphasis added).
56 Cowen, supra, footnote 22, p. 274. See also Falconbridge, supra, footnote 5, p. 666.
57 Falconbridge, supra, p. 667.
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attaching to the bill". 8 Possible grounds for a defect of title set
forth in the Act59 are obtaining the instrument or its acceptance
by fraud, by duress or force and fear, by other unlawful means, or
by illegal consideration, as well as its negotiation in breach of
faith or fraud. As the list is preceded by "in particular", it is
overwhelmingly accepted that "the examples ... do not exhaust
the category". 60
Indeed, "why a breach of positive contract, should not form as
strong a defence, as a breach of faith, is hard to perceive". 61 Yet,
pre-Act cases involved "equities of the bill", "equities that attach
to the bill itself', "equities affecting it", or equities "with which
the bill is incumbered" 62 of a narrower range than the entire
scope of the underlying contract. Thus in Holmes v. Kidd63 where
"[u]pon the concoction of [the] bill it was agreed that it was not to
be paid if the canvas was sold", it was held that "[tihat agreement
directly affects the bill and was part of the consideration for it".
As "the incumbrance on the bill was part of the transaction out of
which the bill arose" 64 the agreement became an equity attaching
thereto. Other examples enumerated in pre-Act case law were
"the payment or satisfaction of the bill itself to such holder, or
where the title of such holder was only to secure the balance of an
account due". 65 While the subjection of an immediate party not a
holder in due course to the defence of total failure of consider-
58 Chalmers, supra, footnote 5, p. 122; Falconbridge, supra, footnote 5, pp. 654, 667 and
670; Alcock v. Smith, [1892] 1 Ch. 238 (C.A.), at p. 263.
59 Can., s. 56(2); U.K., s. 29(2); the provision is set forth in Appendix 1, infra.
60 Cowen, supra, footnote 22, p. 270. See also: Byles, supra, footnote 55, p. 193: Riley on
Bills of Exchange in Australia, 3rd ed., Chappenden and Bilinsky, eds. (Sydney, Law
Book Co., 1976), p. 93. Cf. Chalmers, supra, footnote 5, p. 98; Falconbridge, supra,
footnote 5, p. 672.
61 Evans v. Gray, 12 O.S. 475 at p. 479, 1 Martin R. 238 at p. 240 (S.C.La, 1822). "Breach
of faith" is enumerated in text following footnote 59, supra.
62 A summary of cases as well as of the interchangeable terms used can be found in Re
Overend, Gurney, & Co. (1868), L.R. 6 Eq. 344 at pp. 359-60; Note, "Equities
Attaching to Overdue Bills of Exchange", 49 L.T. 122 (1870).
63 (1858), 3 H. & N. 891 at pp. 893-4, 157 E.R. 729 at p. 730, per Crompton, J. The case
involved a contract governing the instrument (cf. Royal Bank v. Mendel, [19771 6
W.W.R. 10 at p. 11 (B.C. Co. Ct.)) rather than underlying it, a distinction which
erroneously was not noticed by the majority in Edcal Industrial Agents Ltd. v. Redl and
Zimmer (1966), 60 D.L.R. (2d) 289 at p. 293, 58 W.W.R. 527 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.),
where Holmes v. Kidd was cited as an authority to the proposition that breach of
contract is a defect of title.
64 Holmes v. Kidd, supra, at p. 893 H. & N., p. 730 E.R., per Williams, J.
65 Oulds v. Harrison (1854), 10 Exch. 572 at p. 578, 156 E.R. 566 at p. 569, per Parke, B.,
explaining Collenridge v. Farquharson (1816), 1 Stark. 259, 171 E.R. 467.
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ation was explicitly recognized, this recognition was generally66
not made in conjunction with the broad principle of the holder's
subjection to the equities of the instrument. 67
None the less, it is erroneous to put "defect of title" into the
narrow perspective of specific direct cases decided prior to 1882.68
What constitutes "defect of title" is a function of the nature of the
title to bills and notes. 69 Thus, according to Professor Chafee, a
bill or note is both a chattel and a chose in action. Its ownership
"involves not only the right to possess a thing but the right to
sue". 70 Corresponding "to the duplex nature of the negotiable
instrument", equities affecting it "must [thus] be classified
accordingly as they relate to the ownership of the chattel or to
liability on [the] obligation". 71 Under this classification, "equi-
ties" affecting the right to sue, side by side with those affecting
the right to possess the piece of paper, constitute defects of title.
Indeed, the subjection of an assignee of a chose in action "to all
defences existing in respect of the right assigned which would be
available against the assignor seeking to enforce the right
assigned", has long been "expressed by the statement that the
assignee takes subject to all equities".72 In this framework Young
v. Kitchin73 held in the late 19th century that an obligor under an
66 With the possible exception of Puget De Bras v. Forbes (1792), 1 Esp. 117 at p. 118, 170
E.R. 298 at p. 299, per Lord Loughborough.
67 See e.g., Jefferies v. Austin (1738), 1 Str. 674, 93 E.R. 774; Solly v. Hinde (1834), 2 Cr.
& M. 516,149 E.R. 865.
68 Notwithstanding R. T. Donald, "Negotiation of an Overdue Bill of Exchange or
Promissory Note", 8 Alta. L. Rev. 75 (1970).
69 Cf. Falconbridge, supra, footnote 5 at p. 667 "A defect of title . . . relates to the
instrument and affects title to it".
70 Z. Chafee, "Rights in Overdue Paper", 31 Har. L. Rev. 1104 (1917-18), at p. 1109. The
"right to sue" in this context is the power to enforce the obligation rather than the
standing to bring the action.
71 Ibid., at p. 1110.
72 F. T. White and 0. D. Tudor, A Selection of Leading Cases in Equity, 8th ed. (London,
Sweet and Maxwell, Ltd., 1910), vol. 1, p. 142 (emphasis added). Cf. J. B. Ames, "Pur-
chase for Value Without Notice", in Lectures on Legal History (Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1913), 253 at pp. 258-60. An assignment of "any debt or other legal
chose in action" is subject to "all equities which would have been entitled to priority
over the right of the assignee if this Act had not passed". This was originally provided
for in the U.K. in s. 25(6) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873 (U.K.), c. 66,
("the original provision"). Semble s. 54(1) of The Conveyancing and Law of Property
Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 85. See also s. 136 of the Law of Property Act, 1925 (U.K.), c. 20,
under which assignment is "subject to equities having priority over the right of the assig-
nee" (emphasis added). The declaratory nature of the original provision (which has
been retained in Ontario) emerges unequivocally from its language.
73 (1878), 3 Ex. D. 127 at p. 131, per Cleasby, B. The decision was made in conjunction
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assigned contract that had been broken by the obligee-assignor
"has no claim to recover anything against the [assignee]; he only
meets the [assignee's] claim by a counter-claim of damages arising
out of the same contract". Shortly thereafter, in Government of
Newfoundland v. Newfoundland Railway Co. 74 the Privy Council
adhered to this principle and explained how the obligor could
meet the asignee's claim with a counterclaim. The position that
"a party to a contract may assign a portion of it, perhaps a
beneficial portion, so that the assignee shall take the benefit,
wholly discharged of any counter-claim by the other party in
respect of the rest of the contract which may be burdensome" was
considered by the court "a lamentable thing" and accordingly was
rejected. It was thus held that "unliquidated damages [entitling
the obligor to a counterclaim] may ... be set off 75 ... against an
assignee if flowing out of and inseparably connected with the
dealings and transactions which also give rise to the subject of the
assignment" .76
The obligor's equities 77 have thus been perceived quite broadly
to include "the terms and conditions of the contract under which
the indebtedness arose". 78 The proposition which emerges from
both leading cases79 is indeed that an obligor can recoup8 his
with the original provision set forth in footnote 72, supra. Note that the "assignee" in
the text above is an assignee who has not undertaken the assignor's performance of the
underlying contract.
74 (1888), 13 App. Cas. 199 at pp. 212-13. The court did not use the term "equities" but
directly relied on Young v. Kitchin.
75 The use of the term "set-off' in this context is unfortunate: cf. footnotes 37-8 and text,
supra; footnotes 198-203 and text, infra. American jurisprudence prefers the term
"recoupment" see footnote 80, infra.
76 Supra, footnote 74, at p. 213,per Lord Hobhouse.
77 Equities in favour of the obligor should be distinguished from "latent" equities, i.e.,
equities in favour of any person other than the obligor"; Ames, supra, footnote 72 at p.
258. Yet the expression "the obligor's equities" is unfortunate as it also covers the
"equities of the parties", see footnote 82 and text, infra. The expression "equities as to
liability" (see footnotes 70-1 and text, supra) appears to be more accurate.
78 See e.g., National Surety Corp. v. Algernon Blair Inc., 150 S.E. 2d 256 (Ga. C.A. 1966),
cf. Snyder's Ltd. v. Furniture Finance Corp. Ltd., [1931] 1 D.L.R. 398 at p. 406, 66
O.L.R. 79 at p. 88 (S.C. App. Div.), per Orde, J.A., where "an express provision [in a
conditional sale contract] that the contract may be assigned to the defendant company"
was held to be "an equity to which [a competing assignee] was subject".
79 See footnotes 73-76 and text, supra.
80 "Recoupment ... although frequently confused with set-off, is recognized [in American
law] as a distinct principle, namely, the right to present in opposition to the plaintiffs
claim, for its reduction or extinguishment, a right of action in the defendant for loss or
damage sustained by him in the same transaction through [the other party's] breach of
3-5 C.B.L.J.
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damage arising from breach of any term of the assigned contract
by meeting the assignee's claim thereon with a defence whose
subject-matter gives ground to a counterclaim arising from the
breach. Depending on the size of the damages the effect of such
defence is either to extinguish or to diminish the size of the assig-
nee's right but not to charge him with liability. 81
Equities attaching to the instrument were contrasted in pre-Act
case law with "equities of the parties", that is with "collateral
matters [such] as the statutory right of set-off' or with "a right of
set-off ... which is merely a personal right not affecting the bill". 82
This formula appears to be adopted by the Act when speaking of
the holder in due course holding free from "any defect of title ...
as well as from mere personal defences". 83 The scope and the
basis of the latter category will now be contrasted with those of
the former. In turn, this examination will support the earlier
thesis that "defect of title" includes contractual defences.
Strictly speaking, a "mere personal defence" is not
"defence". 84 Rather, it is a claim arising outside the underlying
contract 85 whose availability in the principal claim depends on a
specific statute. A "mere personal defence" is either the right to
set off a separate liquidated claim, or the right to set up an
independent counterclaim for unliquidated damages. The right of
set-off is available to a defendant since a 1729 statute 86 and is
contract or duty": W. H. Loyd, "The Development of Set-Off', 64 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541
(1915-16), at p. 563. Unfortunately no corresponding term has developed in Anglo-Can-
adian law; see footnote 75, supra.
81 Note the statutory deviation from this principle under s. 42a of The Consumer
Protection Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 82, as amended by S.O. 1971, Vol. 2, c. 24, s. 1(1)
(which is the standard provision of provincial consumer protection legislation): The
assignee "is subject to the same obligations, liabilities and duties of the assignor". None
the less, his exposure to consumer defences shall not be in "an amount greater than the
balance owing on the contract at the time of the assignment."
82 Re Overend, Gurney, & Co. (1868), L.R. 6 Eq. 344 at pp. 360-1.
83 See footnote 17 and text, supra.
84 In its broadest sense, "defence" includes recoupment (footnote 80, supra), set-off and
counterclaim; Corbin on Contracts (St. Paul, West Publishing Co. 1951), vol. 4, §896.
85 "Mere personal defences" should not be confused with "personal defences", the latter
expression being interchangeable with "defects of title"; cf. Riley, supra, footnote 60,
p. 106.
86 "An Act for the Relief of Debtors with respect to the Imprisonment of their Persons",
1729, 2 Geo. II, c. 22, s. 13, repealed by the Civil Procedure Acts Repeal Act, 1879
(U.K.), c. 59, and the Statute Law Revision and Civil Procedure Act, 1883 (U.K.), c.
49. Both repealing statutes provided, however (the former in s. 4(1)(b), the latter in s.
5(b)) that:
4(1) The repeal effected by this Act shall not affect
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given to him as of right. 87 The right to assert a counterclaim was
originally introduced by the 1873 Judicature Act. 88 Permission to
present it may be refused under Rules of Practice if in the opinion
of the court it cannot be conveniently disposed of in the pending
action.89
The right to assert a "mere personal defence" is a mode of
adjusting mutual claims or avoiding circuity of action. 90 Being a
separate cause of action against the immediate party rather than
an answer to the claim on the underlying contract, a "mere
personal defence" is confined to the relations between those
immediate parties between whom it arose. It cannot be asserted
against a remote party. 91 A controversial application of this
proposition, in the context of the assignment of a chose in action,
is Stoddart v. Union Trust, Ltd.92 In this case a claim for damages
in respect of the assignor's fraud which had induced the debtor to
enter into the assigned contract was treated by the court as
"strictly a personal claim against the [assignor]". 93 Being "not
connected with the chose in action assigned" 94 the fraud could not
be asserted by way of defence against the assignee's claim 95 unless
(b) Any... principle or rule of law or equity established ... under any enact-
ment, so repealed.
The practice of raising a set-off is presently governed in the U.K. by s. 39(1)(a) of the
Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925 (U.K.), c. 49, and R.S.C.
(Revision), 1962, 0. 18, r. 17 applicable to every claim by the defendant "whether of an
ascertained amount or not". The right to set off a liquidated amount is provided for in
Ontario by The Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 228, ss. 131-3. The provisions are
modelled on those repealed in the U.K. They go, however, further than English law in
allowing a defendant to recover his excess in the action itself: Gates v. Seagram (1909),
19 O.L.R. 216 (C.A.); Grills v. Farah (1910), 21 O.L.R. 457 (H.C.J.).
87 Langdon v. Traders Finance Corp. Ltd. (1965), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 12, [1966] 10. R. 655, 8
C.B.R. (N.S.) 294 (C.A.).
88 The Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873 (U.K.), c. 66, s. 24(3), now s. 39(1) of the
Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925 (U.K.), c. 49. Presently the
right is governed by rules of court: Supreme Court of Ontario, Rules of Practice,
R.R.O. 1970, Reg. 545, Rules 116 and 139 and in the U.K., Rules of the Supreme
Court, 1965, 0. 15, r. 2.
89 See in general: Loyd, supra, footnote 80 at pp. 566-7.
90 Cf. footnotes 199-203 and text, infra.
91 See footnote 57 and text, supra.
92 [1912] 1 K.B. 181 (C.A.).
93 Ibid., at pp. 193-4, per Kennedy, L.J.
94 Ibid., at p. 188, per Vaughan Williams, L.J.
95 Though the good faith of the assignee was explicitly noted (see e.g., Stoddart, ibid., at p.
187, per Vaughan Williams, L.J.), this aspect of the decision should not be overstated.
As the case did not involve a bill or note, the assignee could not be a holder in due
course.
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the contract had been set aside and treated void by the debtor. As
"the fraud induced the very transaction creating the assigned
right" the validity of this decision has been doubted and
criticized. 96 The actual result in the case should, however, be
understood in light of the distinction between "mere representa-
tion" inducing the contract and the "terms" of the agreement
incorporated therein. While the broadening of the category of
''mere personal defences" through collateral contracts or liability
for negligent statements has led to the breakdown of some effects
of the representation-term dichotomy in so far as immediate
parties are concerned, 97 Stoddart v. Union Trust, Ltd. strongly
demonstrates the effect of this classification with respect to the
relations between remote parties. 98 The decision correctly points
out the distinction in law between matters "flowing out of and
inseparably connected with the dealings and transactions [under]
the subject of the assignment" 99 on one hand and matters which
are "not connected with the chose in action assigned"' 1°° on the
other. Only the former are "equities which would have been
entitled to priority over the right of the assignee". 101 The latter
give rise to a mere "claim for damages [which] is a personal claim
against the wrong-doer [falling] dehors the contract"' 10 2 and thus
do not affect the right to sue thereupon.
The availability of the right to set off a liquidated sum due
under an independent transaction (the right of set-off) against a
remote party has introduced some complexity. Indeed, set-off is
the "personal equity" par excellence under the pre-Act case
law. 10 3 This corresponds to the nature of the right as "not a
modification of [the assigned] obligation, but an incident of its
enforcement", 104 a matter of procedure, or "a convenient mode
96 Corbin on Contracts, supra, footnote 84, para. 893, text that follows note 7.
97 See, in general, D. E. Allan, "The Scope of the Contract", 41 A. L.J. 274 (1967-68).
98 Stoddart has not been adopted by the American UCC. Defining contract in s. 1-201(11)
as "the total legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement" (i.e., from their
bargain in fact; s. 1-201(3)), the U.C.C. rejects altogether the representation-term
classification.
99 Supra, footnote 92, at p. 193, per Kennedy, L.J., quoting Lord Hobhouse in
Government of Newfoundland, supra, footnote 74, and distinguishing between Stoddart
and Young, supra, footnote 73.
100 Supra, at p. 188, per Vaughan Williams, L.J.
101 Supra. The phrase is taken from s. 25(6) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873
(U.K.), c. 66. See footnote 72, supra.
102 Supra, footnote 92 at p. 194, per Kennedy, L.J.
103 See footnote 62 and text at footnote 82, supra.
104 Falconbridge, supra, footnote 5, p. 852.
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of settling mutual accounts or preventing multiplicity of actions
between the [original] parties". 10 5 In contrast to the civil law
"compensation" which operates automatically by the sole
operation of law to extinguish mutual obligations,10 6 set-off at
common law is "a personal privilege, and not an incident or
accompaniment of the debt". 10 7 It "is not a defence, but a cross
action [which] concedes the validity of the plaintiff's claim, and is
found upon an independent cause of action in favour of the
defendant, who may at his election assert it by way of set-off, or
enforce it by separate suit". 10 8 From this perspective, it appears,
Falconbridge correctly distinguishes between "an equity relating
to the assigned debt" which must be "inseparably connected with
or inherent in [it] in such a way as to affect [its] validity or the
amount" on one hand, and the "debtor's right of set-off ...
arising from matters wholly unrelated to the assigned debt" on
the other hand.' °9
It follows that the right to set-off should not be available
against a remote party holder not in due course of a bill or note,
as well as against an assignee of a chose in action. It is
overwhelmingly accepted, indeed, that a holder takes an
instrument free from a prior party's right of set-off. 110 None the
less, it is equally well established that an assignee takes a chose in
action subject to the debtor's right to set off a liquidated amount
owing from the assignor under a separate transaction which
accrues before the debtor receives notice of the assignment."1
Following this model, the Canadian Act provides for the
subjection to the right of set-off of a remote party holder of an
105 Ibid., at p. 671.
106 G. Nicholls, "The Legal Nature of Bank Deposits in the Province of Quebec", 13 Can.
Bar Rev. 635 (1935), at p. 647.
107 Lincoln v. Grant, 47 D.C. App. 475 (1918), at p. 483.
108 Ibid. For characterizing both set-off and counterclaims as independent claims, see also
Stooke v. Taylor (1880), 5 Q.B.D. 569 at p. 575 per Cockburn, C.J. Under Rules of
Practice a set-off may be either pleaded as a defence or set up by way of counterclaim:
A-G. Ont. v. Russell (1921), 64 D.L.R. 59, 49 O.L.R. 103 (S.C.). Yet, notwithstanding
Falconbridge (see text at footnote 35, supra), it is misleading to characterize set-off as a
defence (subject to footnote 84, supra). In its nature, set-off is an action: Campbell v.
Imperial Bank, [192414 D.L.R. 289, 55 O.L.R. 318 (S.C. App. Div.).
109 Falconbridge, supra, footnote 5, pp. 162-3.
110 Citations in footnote 62, supra; Falconbridge, supra, footnote 5, p. 667.
111 See e.g., Cavendish v. Geaves (1857), 24 Beav. 163, 53 E.R. 319; Roxburghe v. Cox
(1878), 17 Ch.D. 520 (C.A.), at p. 526,per James, L.J. The rule is presently embodied
in s. 40(1)(b) of The Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 344.
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instrument properly marked as given for a patent right1 12 as well
as of every holder of a properly marked consumer bill or note. u3
The subjection of the assignee is sometimes explained by the
existence of specific statutory provisions.114 The inability to raise
a prior party's set-off against a holder of a negotiable instrument
is often viewed as produced by a specific rule under the old law
merchant. 115 Both suggestions are erroneous. The model set-off
provision in England and other Commonwealth jurisdictions" 6 is
"a simple statute of set-offs" which "simply provides that ... the
defendant may have set off against the demand of the plaintiff
any ... debt due which he has against the plaintiff'.1 1 7 The statute
thus falls short of establishing the obligor's power to set off as
against the assignee a debt due from the creditor (the plaintiffs
assignor).118 As for the unavailability of a prior party's set-off
against a holder not in due course, it has in fact been based in pre-
Act cases on the nature of the right at common law rather than on
any rule particular to the law merchant. 119
One explanation of the assignee's subjection to the debtor's
right of set-off is the equitable origin of the assignee's title. 120
Another explanation is based on the suggestion that the assignee
is "only partly owner" until he gives the debtor notice of the
assignment.' 2' As the holder of a negotiable instrument, whether
112 Can., s. 15, see footnotes 31-41 and text, supra.
113 Can., s. 191, see footnotes 42-52 and text, supra. Set-off is available between two
immediate parties, footnote 57 and text, supra. Therefore, the effect of s. 191 is to
subject also a remote party to it, cf. footnote 52 and text, supra.
114 Falconbridge, supra, footnote 5, p. 671 and pp. 162-3.
115 Stegal v. Union Bank & Fed. Trust Co., 176 S.E. 438 (Va. S.C.A. 1934), at p. 453.
116 See citations in footnote 86, supra.
117 Supra, footnote 115 at p. 447. "A simple statute of set-offs" should be distinguished
from statutes allowing prior party set-offs, under which an assignee is explicitly held
subject to set-offs, supra, at pp. 447-8.
118 Statutes providing that an assignment of contractual rights is without prejudice to any
set-off or defence existing before notice of the assignment have been adopted in most
U.S. jurisdictions: Restatement of the Law: Contracts, 2nd Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-7
(St. Paul, American Law Institute, 1973), p. 321. This is also the position of the
Ontario Personal Property Security Act, supra, footnote 111, as well as UCC
9-318(1)(b).
119 Citations in footnote 62, supra.
120 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, 3rd ed. (New York, Baker, Voorhis &
Co., Inc. 1957), vol. 3, para. 447. S. Williston, "Is the Right of an Assignee of a Chose
in Action Legal or Equitable?", 30 Har. L. Rev. 97 (1916-17), at pp. 101-2.
121 W. W. Cook, "The Alienability of Choses in Action: A Reply to Professor Williston",
30 Har. L. Rev. 449 (1916-17), at pp. 473-4; see also p. 475, ibid., and text at footnote
123, infra.
[Vol. 5
Equities as to Liability on Bills and Notes 71
in due course or not, has always been seen as having the legal title
from the moment of the negotiation, 22 both explanations are also
consistent with his taking the instrument free from a prior party's
right of set-off. There is, however, in this framework no discer-
nible ground for the obligor's inability to set off against a subse-
quent holder the original creditor's indebtedness accruing before
negotiation, for it is clear that until then the legal title to the
instrument remains undivided in the hands of the original
creditor. Likewise, "principles of fairness, of public policy, etc."
which allegedly support the assignee's subjection 123 do not appear
to explain their inapplicability to the holder of an instrument.
In fact, the assignee's subjection to the obligor's right of set-off
is one aspect of the original common law position with respect to
the assignee's rights. Thereunder, "the so-called assignee is not
... successor, but [merely] an attorney with a power to collect or
dispose of the claim for his own use". 123a It is none the less, incon-
gruous to think today of the assignee's position towards the claim
on the assigned debt as different from the holder's position
towards the claim upon the instrument negotiated to him.
It is suggested here that as the right of set-off is not an "equity
relating to the assigned debt" but rather a "personal equity", it
should be governed in principle by the same rule applicable to
other counterclaims or cross demands. 124 The right should thus
not be made available against the assignee of a chose in action as
well as against a remote party holder not in due course. Apart
from a specific statutory provision, 125 the assignee's subjection to
the right of set-off can only be based on the assignor-debtor
agreement. Indeed, a contractual term incorporating the right of
set-off into the assigned contract can exist whether or not the debt
has been embodied in a negotiable instrument, in which case it is
obvious that the right of set-off turns into an "equity" whether
"relating to the assigned debt" or "attaching to the instrument"
embodying it. 126 What appears then to be inexplicable is why
122 Z. Chafee, "Rights in Overdue Paper", 31 Har. L. Rev. 1104 (1917-18), at p. 1112.
123 Cook, supra footnote 121 at p. 475.
123a Ames, supra, footnote 72, at p. 258.
124 See footnote 108 and text, supra. Suggestions as to the difference between counter-
claims and set-offs (see footnote 34-8 and text, supra) go to Rules of Practice and not to
their inherent nature. See e.g., Gates v. Seagram (1909), 19 O.L.R. 216 (C.A.).
125 See footnote 118, supra.
126 Falconbridge, supra, footnote 5, p. 671 and note (i). See also National Surety Corp. v.
Algernon Blair, Inc., 150 S.E. 2d 256,258 (Ga. C.A., 1966).
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original parties are not presumed to intend the incorporation of
the right of set-off into the underlying contract once a negotiable
instrument has been used. Neither the classification of set-off as a
"mere personal defence" nor the inability to raise it against a
remote party not a holder in due course is affected by this query.
It may be concluded that in drawing a contrast between "defect
of title" and "mere personal defences" 127 the Act follows the pre-
Act differentiation between an "equity attaching to the bill" and
the "equities of the parties".128 In turn the latter differentiation is
modelled on the contrast between an "equity relating to the
assigned debt"'129 and "a personal claim" which is "not connected
with the chose in action assigned". 130 The comprehensiveness of
the equities "relating to the assigned debt" with respect to all
"the terms and conditions of the contract under which the indebt-
edness arose"1 3' entails that all defences arising from the under-
lying contract are defects of title. This formula specifically
excludes counterclaims arising from separate matters, whether in
liquidated or unliquidated amounts.
III. "Equities as to Liability" and the Obligation Under a
Negotiable Instrument
Regarding the terms of an assigned executory contract as
"equities attaching thereto" has been based on the premise that
"[tihe thing ... which was assigned ... was not any absolute
property of [the assignor], but that which was coming to him
under the [executory] contract, and was therefore, subject to [its]
conditions". 32 Yet a negotiable instrument is an unconditional
order 133 or promise 34 to pay. It is a unilateral contract 35 not
governed by "an equitable adjustment of performances" appli-
127 See footnote 17 and text, supra.
128 See footnote 82 and text, supra.
129 See footnote 109 and text, supra.
130 See footnotes 93-4 and text, supra.
131 See footnote 78 and text, supra.
132 Tooth v. Hallet (1869), L.R. 4 Ch. 242 at p. 243 (emphasis added); explicitly relied on
in Young v. Kitchin (1878), 3 Ex. D. 127 at p. 130 and note 2.
133 See footnote 2, supra.
134 See footnote 3, supra.
135 "A unilateral contract consists of a promise ... made by one of the contracting parties
only"; Corbin on Contracts (St Paul, West Publishing Co., 1963), vol. 1, §21, p. 52.
Examples of unilateral contracts explicitly include a promissory note and a bill of
exchange, ibid., pp. 55-6.
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cable under "the well known doctrine of implied conditions in the
field of bilateral contracts". 136 The subjection of its holder to the
obligor's contractual defences therefore requires further explana-
tion.
To begin with, equity jurisdiction over adjustment of remedies
relating to one transaction preceded any theory of implied depen-
dency of performances. Thus, under medieval common law, 137 a
seller's undertaking to provide a sound horse was treated as
separate from, and collateral to, his primary undertaking to
provide a horse, "as if the giving of a warranty formed a separate
transaction". 138 In this framework, the buyer's obligation to pay
for the horse was an independent covenant. It was absolute and
its enforcement was not dependent on the fulfilment of the
seller's warranty. 139 None the less, there is early authority
upholding the right of a buyer "sued at law for the price" and
wishing "to set-off his loss from the breach of [the seller's]
warranty" to "come ... to the chancellor and pray . . . for a
certiorari, to have the whole case heard in equity".1 40 The uncon-
ditional nature of the buyer's obligation in relation to the seller's
warranty under the common law was not conceived as a bar to
viewing the two obligations as one case in equity.' 4 ' The same
reasoning can easily be applied to the relationship created by the
buyer's unconditional obligation under a negotiable instrument
towards the seller's performance of the underlying contract.
Morever, an analogy can be drawn between the availability of
the obligor's defences in an action on a negotiable instrument and
their availability in an action on a document under seal ("spe-
cialty contract"). A negotiable instrument, "quite like . . . a
specialty ... stands apart, complete in itself". 142 Its effect on the
transaction under which it is given, 143 is akin to the effect of an
136 R. W. Aigler, "Conditions in Bills and Notes", 26 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1927-28), at pp.
479-80.
137 Up to the turn of the 19th century. See footnotes 195-8 and text, infra,
138 A. W. B. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action
of Assumpsit (London, Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 243.
139 Cf. Loyd, supra, footnote 80 at pp. 545-6.
140 W. T. Barbour, "The History of Contract in Early English Equity", in Oxford Studies
in Social and Legal History (1914), vol. 4, pp. 115-116, citing 15th century Chancery
records.
141 Arguably, here lie the foundations of the doctrine of "equitable set-off": cf. footnotes
202-3 and text, infra. Its application to sale of goods was none the less abandoned: cf.
footnotes 193-203 and text, infra.
142 Aigler, supra, footnote 136 at p. 480 and note 35.
143 See footnote 5, supra.
1980-81]
74 Canadian Business Law Journal
undertaking contained in a specialty contract ("obligation") on
the contract evidenced by it. As early as 1422 it was indeed deter-
mined that "if I am your debtor . . . by a simple contract and I
make an obligation to you for the same [amount] on the same
contract ... I am discharged of the contract by obligation". 144
It was settled under medieval common law that "in Debt on a
contract the plaintiff shows in his count for what cause the
defendant has become his debtor. Otherwise in Debt on an
obligation [specialty] for the obligation is a contract in itself'. 145
Being of "high nature" the undertaking under a specialty contract
was divorced from the consideration thereto and could not be
varied or contradicted by any extrinsic evidence. "The defendant
was bound by the deed, the whole deed and nothing but the
deed. '146 Accordingly, failure of consideration under the basic
transaction did not constitute at common law a valid defence to
an action on the deed. 147
None the less, defences founded on the conduct of the obligee
on a specialty could successfully be raised in equity. Thus,
"whenever it was plainly unjust for [the obligee] to insist upon his
strict legal right" the Chancellor would "furnish the obligor with
a defense by enjoining the action". 148 Equitable jurisdiction
explicitly encompassed the defence of failure of consideration
under the underlying contract. 149
Though in itself not a specialty,1 50 a negotiable instrument has
been characterized as "the modern mercantile specialty". 151
Professor Chafee accordingly suggested that equities affecting the
right to sue upon the instrument ("equities as to liability") are
144 Salman v. Barkyng (1422), Y.B. 1 Hen. VI (S.S. vol. 50), 114 at p. 115,perBabington,
J. Note the medieval terminology: "contract" is not "promise" but the benefit
conferred on the defendant under the transaction. "Obligation" is the specialty
contract. C.H.S. Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law: Tort and Contract
(London, Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1949), p. 225.
145 Anon (1385), Bellewe 111, 72 E.R. 47 (the English translation, according to Fifoot,
supra).
146 Fifoot, supra, footnote 144, p. 231.
147J. B. Ames, "Specialty Contracts and Equitable Defences", in Lectures On Legal
History (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1913), 104 at p. 108.
148 Ibid., at p. 106.
149 Ibid., at pp. 108-9. Other defences were frauds, illegality, payment, accord and satis-
faction, discharge of surety, accomodation, duress, agreement not to sue and
acquiescence.
150 Cf. Rann v. Hughes (1787), 7 T.R. 350 at note (a), 101 E.R. 1014 at note (a).
151 Ames, supra, footnote 147, p. 115.
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parallel to grounds upon which an obligor on a specialty "would
before modern statutes152 have had to go into chancery to
maintain his defense". 153 While the availability of failure of
consideration against an action on a specialty contract is
supported by case law dealing with total failure of consideration
alone, 154 once the veil separating the deed and the basic trans-
action has been pierced no logical line can be drawn between
different types of defences available on the underlying contract.
It has been said that a bill of exchange "is itself a contract
separate from the [underlying] contract for sale", operating "as a
contract in its own right". 155 This, however, should not result in
the insulation of a holder of the bill from the defences arising
from the underlying sale. Adjustment of remedies arising from
the same transaction leads to the definition of the liability on the
unilateral contract undertaken thereunder. This tends to
obliterate the distinction between bilateral and unilateral
contracts. 56 It hardly makes any difference indeed, whether an
obligation to pay is excused on the basis of the other party's
failure to perform his part of a bilateral contract, or whether it is
excused on the basis of a defence arising from the same failure to
perform in a case of a unilateral contract.15 7 On final account,
"the laws distinguishing negotiable instruments from non-nego-
tiable instruments are not based upon any inherent distinctions
between the obligations assumed in the one class or the other of
such contracts".1 58 The unconditionality of the engagement on a
bill or note goes to form only and is not a matter of substance.159
152 The Common Law Procedure Act, 1854 (U.K.), c. 125, s. 83.
153 Chaffee, supra, footnote 70 at p. 1111.
154 Tourville v. Naish (1734), 3 P.Wms. 307, 24 E.R. 1077, and a "case of the time of
Henry VI" whose facts are outlined by Ames, supra, footnote 147, p. 108.
155 Nova (Jersey) Knit Ltd. v. Kammgarn Spinnerei GmbH, [1977] 2 All E.R. 463 (H.L.),
at pp. 479-80 per Lord Russell of Killowen. See also Anglo-Italian Bank v. Wells
(1878), 38 L.T. 197 (C.A.), at p. 199. The "separate contract" theory led in these cases
to a contrary result to the result argued in the text above.
156 For this distinction in general, see Corbin On Contracts, supra, footnote 135, §21.
157 Cf. footnotes 135-6 and text, supra.
158 Pitman v. Walker, 187 Cal. 667 (S.C. 1922), at p. 672, cited with approval by Aigler,
supra, footnote 136 at p. 479 and note 33.
159 The other side of the coin is a contract for sale containing a cut-off clause (i.e., a term
whereby the buyer waives his right to assert his defences against an assignee): Killoran
v. Monticello State Bank (1921), 57 D.L.R. 359, 61 S.C.R. 528, [1921] 1 W.W.R. 988.
It is not a "negotiable instrument" notwithstanding the resulting unconditional
obligation of the buyer. Cf. Geiger Finance Co. v. Graham, 182 S.E. 2d 521 (Ga. C.A.,
1971).
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The availability of the maker's or drawer's defences against an
action on the instrument has thus not been barred by the uncondi-
tional language of the promise or order. "The content of a
promise [or order] is one thing, the development and recognition
of a defense quite another." 160
IV. The Defence of Failure of Consideration
In the law of bills and notes, "there is a failure of consideration
where the performance is either absent, incomplete, or
defective". 161 "Failure of consideration" is thus interchangeable
with the breach of the underlying contract. The total breach
thereof is known as a total failure of consideration as, for
example, where a seller does not provide the goods he promised
to sell. At the same time, "where some benefit has been
received", the failure of consideration is partial. 162 Where a
seller's breach constitutes the provision of only some of the goods
under the contract (e.g., two out of three cars) the partial failure
of consideration is in an ascertained or liquidated amount. Other-
wise, as for example in the case of breach of warranty with
respect to goods sold and delivered which gives rise to a claim for
unliquidated damages, the partial failure is in a sum uncertain. 163
The traditional summary of the rules which under Anglo-Can-
adian law determine the availability of the defence of failure of
consideration to an action on a bill or note by a holder not in due
course is inconsistent with the analysis made so far in this article.
Under this summary, 164 total failure of consideration is a defence
against an immediate party and possibly against a remote holder
for value with notice. Quaere, whether it is a defence against a
remote party without notice who is none the less not a holder in
due course. Partial failure of consideration is a defence pro tanto
160 Aigler, supra, footnote 136 at p. 480.
161 Note, "Failure of Consideration in Negotiable Instruments", 25 Col. L. Rev. 83 (1925)
(hereafter "Note - Failure"). Under general principles of law "failure of considera-
tion" is broader. See S. J. StolIjar, "The Doctrine of Failure of Consideration", 75
L.Q.R. 53 (1959); S. Williston A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (New York, Baker,
Voorhis & Co., Inc., 1957), 3rd ed., vol. 6, para. 814.
162 Note - Failure, ibid., at p. 86.
163 The observation that "damages for breach of contract is not a failure of consideration":
Edcal Industrial Agents Ltd. v. Redl and Zimmer (1966), 60 D.L.R. (2d) 289 at p. 297,
58 W.W.R. 527 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.), is, with respect, incorrect.
164 See, in general, Chalmers, supra, footnote 5, pp. 103-4; Falconbridge, supra, footnote
5, p. 620.
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against an immediate party and is available only when the failure
is in an ascertained and liquidated amount. It is not a defence
against a remote party holder for value. "Holder for value" is a
holder who either himself took the instrument for value, or who
derives his title from one who had given value for it.16 He does
not have to be a holder in due course.
The availability of the defence of failure of consideration
against a holder not in due course depends under this summary
first on whether the claimant holder for value is an immediate or
a remote party. 166 Secondly, it depends on whether the failure
involved has been total or partial. 167 The validity of these classifi-
cations will now be examined.
It appears that the immediate-remote party dichotomy can
easily be dismissed as groundless. None of the leading cases cited
by Chalmers168 and Falconbridge 169 either turned on the identity
of the plaintiff as a remote party not a holder in due course or
otherwise purported to establish a distinction between different
claimants who are not holders in due course. Thus, a leading case
as to the availability of partial failure of consideration in an ascer-
tained or liquidated amount involved a remote rather than an
immediate party. 170 Furthermore, support for the proposition
that partial failure of consideration "is not a defence against a
remote party who is a holder for value"' 171 is drawn by Chalmers
and Falconbridge from a case which in fact turned on the type of
defence involved rather than on the immediate-remote party
dichotomy. 172 Other cases holding that failure of consideration,
whether partial 173 or total, 174 is no defence against a remote party
165 Cf. Barclays Bank Ltd. v. Astley Industrial Trust Ltd., 11970] 2 Q.B.D. 527 at pp. 538-
9, per Milmo, J.: Can., s. 54(l); U.K., s. 27.
166 There is no further subdivision between a holder for value and a holder who is not.
Once "valuable consideration" (or "value" see Can., ss. 2, 53(1); U.K., ss. 2, 27(1)) is
given by a holder, he and all subsequent holders are holders for value. "Failure of
consideration" can thus arise only in the context of a holder for value.
167 There is further subdivision between partial failure which is in an ascertained and liqui-
dated amount, and partial failure which is in sum uncertain. See text following footnote
164, supra.
168 Chalmers, supra, footnote 5, p. 103 and note 26, p. 104 and notes 34-5.
169 Falconbridge, supra, footnote 5, p. 620 and notes (1), (m), (p) and (q).
170 Agra and Masterman's Bank Ltd. v. Leighton (1866), 2 Ex. D. 56. See also McGregor
v. Bishop (1887), 14 O.R. 7 (H.C.J.).
171 Chalmers, supra, footnote 5, at p. 104 and note 35, Falconbridge, supra, footnote 5, p.
620 and note (q).
172 Archer v. Bamford (1822), 3 Stark 175, 171 E.R. 812. Cf. footnote 181 and text, infra.
173 Ashley Colter, Ltd. v. Scott, [194213 D.L.R. 538 at p. 541, [19421 S.C.R. 331.
174 Robinson v. Reynolds (1841), 2 Q.B. 196 at p. 211, 114 E.R. 76 at p. 82 (Ex. Ch.);
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turned on the holder in due course status of the remote party.
Unfortunately, however, they often used the terms "indorsee for
value", 75 "holder for value", 76 or "remote party"1 77 as inter-
changeable with "holder in due course". This inaccurate use of
the terms178 has indeed been a source of confusion resulting in
creating the erroneous impression that, in so far as failure of
consideration is concerned, a remote party, even when not a
holder in due course, is in a better position than an immediate
party. It is my thesis, however, that all parties who are not
holders in due course, whether immediate or remote, are in the
same position with respect to the defence of failure of considera-
tion.
This analysis results in the availability of total failure of consid-
eration as a defence against every holder not in due course. It
likewise results in the availability of partial failure of consider-
ation expressed in an ascertained and liquidated amount as a
defence pro tanto against such a holder. 179 The remaining issue is
the position of a holder not in due course towards partial failure
which is not in an ascertained or liquidated amount.
The fact that partial failure of consideration not in an ascer-
tained and liquidated amount cannot be raised as a defence
against a holder not in due course is overwhelmingly accepted.18 0
Indeed, the defence of an effective repudiation of the underlying
contract is available against a holder not in due course even when
its ground is a partial failure in a sum uncertain. 181 What is meant
by the holder's power to overcome the defence is rather, the
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay & Co., [1918] 1 K.B. 43 at p. 53, affd on
this point [1918] 2 K.B. 623 (C.A.).
175 Robinson v. Reynolds, supra, footnote 174.
176 Thiedemann v. Goldschmidt (1859), 1 De G. F. & J. 4 at p. 12, 45 E.R. 260 at p. 263
per Lord Justice Knight Bruce. The Lord Chancellor properly referred to the indorsee
as "a holder bonafide for value", ibid., at p. 11 De G. F. & J., p. 263 E.R.
177 Ashley Colter, Ltd. v. Scott, supra, footnote 173.
178 Cf. footnote 165 and text, supra.
179 Cf. text subsequent footnote 164, supra.
180 See footnote 164 and following text, supra. Modern exceptions are Harris, Son & Co.
v. Vallarman & Co., [1940] 1 All E.R. 185 (C.A.); Garage Auguste Lachaine Ltee v.
Legris, [1955] Que. K.B. 833; Saga of Bond Street Ltd. v. Avalon Promotions Ltd.,
[1972] 2 Q.B. 325 at p. 327, [1972] 2 All E.R. 545 at p. 547 (C.A.), per Salmon, L.J.,
and Edcal, supra, footnote 163. See also the decision of Thesiger, L.J., in Anglo-Italian
Bank v. Wells (1878), 38 L.T. 197 (C.A.), at p. 201.
181 Cf. Archer v. Bamford (1822), 3 Stark. 175, 171 E.R. 812. Cf also Stoddart v. Union
Trust, Ltd., [1912] 1 K.B. 181 (C.A.) (the availability as against an assignee of valid
repudiation of the contract even when based on a "mere personal defence").
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defendant's inability to reduce or extinguish his liability by
meeting an action on a bill or note with a defence based on fact
giving rise to a claim for unliquidated damages stemming from
the breach of the underlying contract itself. 182 Thus, under "a
deep rooted concept of English commercial law", "the nature
and function of... a bill" is,
... not merely to serve as a negotiable instrument, it is also to avoid
postponement of the purchaser's liability to the vendor himself, a
postponement grounded on some allegation of failure in some respect by
the vendor under the underlying contract, unless it be total or quantified
partial failure of consideration. 183
Accordingly, where the defendant has "derived some benefit ...
the question how much, being one of unliquidated damages,
could be decided in a cross action."' 184 Though he may pursue this
cross claim, the defendant "ought first to pay his cheque", 185 and
to pursue his remedy in a separate proceeding against the party
liable for the breach.
Chalmers186 and Falconbridge 187 undermine the effect of the
obligor's inability to raise partial failure in a sum uncertain as a
defence against a holder not in due course. Their opinion is that
following the Judicature Acts, it is possible to include such a
failure of consideration in a counterclaim "which may have all the
practical consequences of a defence to the claim." This view is
none the less erroneous. The raising of a counterclaim contem-
plates the personal liability of the defendant thereunder (the
plaintiff in the principal action).1 88 Yet an obligor "has no claim
to recover anything against [a remote party]". 189 The latter's
subjection to a counterclaim arising from the breach of the under-
lying contract can mean no more than subjection to the obligor's
power to meet the claim by a defence based on facts giving rise to
the counterclaim.1 90 Thus, the immunity of a remote party from
182 See e.g., Solomon v. Turner (1815), 1 Stark 51 at p. 52, 171 E.R. 398 at p. 379, where
Lord Ellenborough "will not admit the evidence for the purpose of reducing the
damages by shewing that the pictures were of an inferior value".
183 Nova (Jersey) Knit Ltd. v. Kammgarn Spinnerei GmbH, [1977] 2 All E.R. 463 (H.L.),
at pp. 479-80, per Lord Russell of Killowen (cited with approval in Williams & Glyn's
Bank Ltd. v. Belkin Packaging Ltd. (1979), 8 B.L.R. 238 at p. 254 (B.C.S.C.)).
184 Day v. Nix (1824), 2 L.J.(O.S.)C.P. 133.
185 Jackson v. Murphy (1888),4 T.L.R. 92 (O.B.).
186 Chalmers, supra, footnote 5, pp. 104-5.
187 Falconbridge, supra, footnote 5, p. 621 and note (s).
188 Cf. footnotes 34-5 and text, footnotes 73-81 and text, supra.
189 See footnote 73 and text, supra.
190 But note the confusion that needlessly arose in Edcal Industrial Agents Ltd. v. Redl and
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the defence of partial failure of consideration in a sum uncertain
confers on him in relation to this defence an absolute right on the
instrument as if he were a holder in due course. Chalmers' and
Falconbridge's views may be relevant only in the context of an
immediate party who is personally liable on the counterclaim.
Yet, even with respect to such a party, courts stress the fact that a
counterclaim "is not an absolute right to set off damages against a
debt" but "merely a right depending on the discretion of the
judge". 191 As against an action on a bill or note the prevailing
tendency is to disallow a counterclaim for unliquidated damages
based on the underlying contract.191a Underlying this tendency is
indeed, the belief in the existence of a substantive rule of law
which gives the holder (whether an immediate or remote party)
an absolute right to recover on the instrument. 192 Thus, notwith-
standing Chalmers' and Falconbridge's obervations, the alleged
holder's immunity cannot be circumvented by rules of procedure.
In the past, the obligor's inability to assert the defence of a sum
uncertain against a holder of an instrument coincided with the
common law rule under which a breach of warranty with respect
to goods sold could not be introduced to decrease the amount of
recovery in the action on the contract for their sale. 193 The latter
rule was originally explained by treating the sale of a chattel and
the giving of a warranty with respect to it as two separate and
independent transactions. 194 By the turn of the 19th century this
rationale had disappeared and the common law rule was
Zimmer (1966), 60 D.L.R. (2d) 289, 58 W.W.R. 527 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.). While
deciding that breach of contract which gives rise to a claim for unliquidated damage
does constitute "defect of title", the court erroneously required the obligor to file a
counterclaim against the immediate party (and not merely to plead the subject-matter
in defence) as a condition to the availability of the breach as a defence to the action of
the remote party, ibid., at pp. 297-8 D.L.R.
191 Anglo-Italian Bank v. Wells (1878), 38 L.T. 197 (C.A.), at p. 199,perJessel, M.R. Cf.
footnote 89 and text, supra.
191a "This discretion is rarely exercised in the case of a claim on a bill of exchange save in
exceptional cases": Nova (Jersey) Knit Ltd. v. Kammgarn Spinnerei GmbH, [1977] 2
All E.R. 463 (H.L.), at p. 474,per Lord Salmon. See also: Newman v. Lever (1888), 4
T.L.R. 91 (Q.B.), at p. 92 per Stephen, J., "without . .. strong grounds a counter-
claim ought not to be allowed in an action on a bill ... which is not disputed".
192 See e.g., James Lamont & Co., Ltd. v. Hyland, Ltd. (No. 2), [1950] 1 All E.R. 929
(C.A.), and Krauss v. Luciuk, [1928] 1 D.L.R. 1132 at p. 1134, [1928] 1 W.W.R. 184,
22 S.L.R. 374 (C.A.), per Martin, J.A., "the defendant has not set up a counterclaim,
and even if he had, I do not see how any relief could be given".
193 See Note - Failure, supra, footnote 161 at p. 86.
194 See footnotes 137-9 and text, supra.
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explained by the unfairness of surprising a plaintiff-seller who
''may only come prepared to prove the agreement for the specific
sum". 195 This explanation marked the fall of the common law
rule. Following some cases ignoring the rule, 196 Lord Tenterden,
C.J., stated in Street v. Blay "on the principle ... of avoiding
circuity of action ... the plaintiff [seller] ought to be prepared to
prove compliance with his warranty, which is part of the consider-
ation for the specific price agreed with the defendant [buyer] to
be paid". 97 The common law rule was finally reversed in Mondel
v. Steel, which held in an action for the price of goods sold that "it
is competent for the defendant [buyer] not to set-off, by a
proceeding in the nature of a cross action, the amount of damages
which he has sustained by breach of the contract, but simply to
defend himself by shewing how much less the subject-matter of
the action was worth, by reason of the breach of contract". 198
It is often said that this change in the common law rule "was
made, not upon any principle of law, but upon grounds of
convenience, in order to prevent circuity of action."' 199 Such view
obliterates the distinction between the availability of a counter-
claim arising from the subject-matter of the claim, and of a
counterclaim arising from a separate matter. 200 It appears from
the preceding discussion, that while avoidance of circuity of
action was the moving force behind recognizing the availability of
195 Basten v. Butler (1806), 7 East 479 at p. 483, 103 E.R. 185 at p. 187.
196 See Germaine v. Burton (1821), 3 Stark 32, 171 E.R. 757; Lomi v. Tucker (1829) 4 Car.
& P. 15, 172 E.R. 586. Cf. also Kist v. Atkinson (1809), 2 Camp. 63, 170 E.R. 1082;
Thornton v. Place (1832), 1 M. & Rob. 218, 174 E.R. 74. But cf. Templer v. M'Lachlan
(1806), 2 Bos. & Pul. (N.R.) 136, 127 E.R. 576; a cross claim in negligence cannot be
set up as a defence to an action on an attorney's bill. Anyway, the case was decided the
same year as Basten v. Butler, supra, footnote 195. Great weight was given to the
argument that "a Plaintiff who sues upon his bill, does not come prepared to prove any
thing more than the business done, and is not in a situation to meet a charge of negli-
gence": Templer at p. 140 Bos. & Pul. (N.R.), p. 577 E.R. Cf. footnote 195 and text,
supra.
197 (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 456 at pp. 462-3, 109 E.R. 1212 at p. 1214 (obiter). Cf. note (a) to
Germaine v. Burton, supra, footnote 196, where the buyer's right "to prove the inferi-
ority of the article in diminution of damages, in an action [for] the stipulated price" was
said to follow from the right of a purchaser of a warranted article who returns it "still
[to] maintain an action for breach of warranty".
198 (1841), 8 M. & W. 858 at pp. 871-2, 151 E.R. 1288 at p. 1293, per Parke, B. The rule is
presently embodied in The Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 421, s. 51(1)(a) and the
Sale of Goods Act, 1979 (U.K.), c. 54, s. 53(1)(a).
199 Bow, McLachlan & Co., Ltd. v. The Ship "Camosun", [19091 A.C. 597 (P.C.), at p.
611.
200 See footnotes 90-1 and text, supra.
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the former, this recognition ultimately expressed itself in a
principle of substantive law. "That it was no mere procedural rule
designed to avoid circuity of action but a substantive defence at
common law was the very point decided in Mondel v. Steel."
20 1
While historically this change relating to "contracts for sale of
goods and for work and labour" was "independent of the
doctrine of 'equitable set-off' developed by the Court of
Chancery to afford similar relief in ... other types of contract" ,202
its effect was to make one principle of law applicable to the avail-
ability of defences arising from all types of contract. 20 3
Over some trend to conform to this change in the general
contract law, 20 4 the weight of authority declined to reverse the
inability to raise a partial failure in a sum uncertain against a
holder not in due course of bills and notes. 2 5 Rather, over the
years doctrinal rationales to this inability have been sought and
developed. Thus, it was stated, "the mere question of damages
never gives a court of equity jurisdiction ... The account which a
court of equity adjusts must be one of debtor and creditor, and
not an account of debts one way and of damages the other
way". 2°6 None the less, this argument is valid only in the context
of an adjustment of claims arising from separate matters. 207 It has
anyway become obsolete since the 1873 Judicature Act 20 8 which
"distinctly put[s] an unliquidated claim on the same footing as a
201 Gilbert-Ash (Northern) Ltd. v. Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd., [1973] 3 All E.R.
195 (H.L.), at p. 215, per Lord Diplock.
202 Ibid. But see footnotes 140-1 and text, supra. The evolution of this doctrine of "equi-
table set-off' is traced in Morgan & Son, Ltd. v. S. Martin Johnson & Co. Ltd., [1949]
1 K.B. 107 (C.A.), at pp. 112-3, per Tucker, L.J.
203 As the doctrine of "equitable set-off" lies within the discretion of the court (see e.g.,
Rawson v. Samuel (1841), Cr. & Ph. 161, 41 E.R. 451), some distinction remained
between "contracts for sale ... and for work and labour" on one hand and "other types
of contracts" on the other hand: Gilbert Ash (Northern) Ltd., supra, footnote 201 at p.
215, relying on Hanak v. Green, [1958] 2 All E.R. 141 (C.A.), at pp. 149-50, per
Morris, L.J. The account given in Kaps Transport Ltd. v. McGregor Telephone and
Power Construction Co. Ltd. (1970), 13 D.L.R. (3d) 732 at pp. 734-5, 73 W.W.R. 549
(Alta. S.C. App. Div.), is over-simplistic in dealing with both developments as one.
204 De Sewhanberg v. Buchanan (1832), 5 Car. & P. 343, 172 E.R. 1004.
205 See Note - Failure, supra, footnote 161 at p. 86.
206 Glennie v. fmri (1839), 3 Y. & C. Ex. 436 at pp. 442-3, 160 E.R. 773. Cf. also the
dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Galipeault in Garage Auguste Lachaine Ltee v.
Legris, [1955] Que. K.B. 833 at p. 835.
207 "The mere existence of cross-demands is not sufficient" to invoke the doctrine of
"equitable set-off" (See footnote 202 and text, supra); Rawson v. Samuel (1841), Cr. &
Ph. 161 at p. 178, 41 E.R. 451 at p. 458.
208 Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873 (U.K.), c. 66.
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liquidated claim for the purpose of set-off". 2°9 From this
viewpoint it was indeed correctly stated that the holder's
immunity from a partial failure in a sum uncertain is produced by
a historical anomaly and "there is probably no longer a reason for
continuing it". 2
10
There is, however, another rationale to the limited scope of the
defence of failure of consideration. The holder's power over
partial failure in a sum uncertain was thus explained in James
Lamont & Co., Ltd. v. Hylands, Ltd. (No. 2) "treating the
execution of a bill of exchange either as analogous to a payment in
cash, or as amounting to an independent contract within the wider
contract in pursuance of which it was executed, and not
dependent as regards its enforcement on due performance of the
latter". 211 Both grounds, respectively called the "payment in
cash" and "independent contract" theory, will now carefully be
considered.
It has already been argued in Part III that the unconditional
language of the contract on a bill or note does not lead to the
separation between the liability thereon and the defences arising
from the underlying contract. Indeed, rather than focusing on the
language of the undertaking, the "independent contract" theory
rests on a specific agreement. 212 Thereunder, a "distinction
[exists] between an action for the price of the goods, and an
action on the security given for them. In the former, the value
only can be recovered; in the latter . . . the party holding bills
given for the price of goods supplied can recover them, unless
there has been a total failure of consideration". 213 As for the
209 Bankes v. Jarvis, [1903] 1 K.B. 549 at p. 553. See also Government of Newfoundland v.
Newfoundland Railway Co. (1888), 13 App. Cas. 199 (P.C.), at p. 213; Bow,
McLachlan & Co. Ltd. v. The Ship "Camosun", [1909] A.C. 597 (P.C.), at pp. 610-11.
But cf. footnotes 84-9 and text, supra.
210 Edcal Industrial Agents Ltd. v. Redl and Zimmer (1966), 60 D.L.R. (2d) 289 at p. 297,
58 W.W.R. 527 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.), following Harris, Son & Co. v. Vallarman &
Co., [194011 All E.R. 185 (C.A.).
211 [1950] 1 All E.R. 929 at p. 931 (emphasis added). It was erroneously observed in Royal
Bank v. Mendel, [1977] 6 W.W.R. 10 (B.C. Co. Ct.), at p. 11,per Spencer, Co. Ct. J.,
that the defence alleged in James Lamont arose through some collateral matter. "[A]
salutary reminder of the character of a bill of exchange as future cash" is Nova (Jersey)
Knit Ltd. v. Kammgarn Spinnerei GmbH, [1977] 2 All E.R. 463 (H.L.); F. R. Ryder,
Note, [1977] J. Bus. Law 247.
212 This is the explanation of the decision of Jessel, M.R., in Anglo-Italian Bank v. Wells
(1878), 38 L.T. 197 (C.A.), at p. 199. His reference there to "some other contract" was
unfortunate: but cf. James Lamont & Co., Ltd., supra, footnote 211 at p. 932; and
footnote 155 and text, supra.
213 Obbard v. Betham (1830), M. & M. 483 at p. 485, 173 E.R. 1232. See also the expla-
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"payment in cash" theory, under it "the payment by a bill of
exchange is to be taken as the payment of so much cash; the
defendant ought to satisfy the bill and proceed upon the remedy
for the breach of warranty". 21 4
Both grounds thus appear separate from general principles of
law as to the relationship between an action for the price of goods
and either the defence of breach of warranty or the defence of an
unliquidated claim.215 There is indeed some old authority
explicitly suggesting the independence of the rule governing the
scope of the defence of failure of consideration in the law of bills
and notes from any principle governing the cause of action on the
contract for sale.21 6 None the less, this view may be oversim-
plistic. First, in Lewis v. Cosgrave, 2 7 a plaintiff who attempted to
extend the "independent contract" theory into a case of total
failure of consideration was met by an argument drawn from an
analogy to the rule under which a plaintiff in an action on the sale
is non-suited where total failure of consideration is involved.
Secondly, it appears that historically objection to the holder's
power to recover over partial failure in a sum uncertain coincided
with the opposition to the common law rule separating the action
for the price of goods and the breach of warranty with respect to
them. Thus, Lord Kenyon who as early as 1791218 and 1794219
upheld the availablity of partial failure of consideration in a sum
uncertain as a defence pro tanto to an action on an instrument,
was quoted in 1788 to be "of opinion that [in an action for goods
sold and delivered] the non-compliance with the warranty might
have been given in evidence ... in reduction of the damages". 220
nation to a pre-1806 case Morgan v. Richardson 7 East 482 at note (a), 103 E.R. 187 at
note (a) (cf. also the note at 1 Camp. 40, 170 E.R. 868); Lewis v. Cosgrave (1809), 2
Taunt. 2,127 E.R. 974; Robinson v. Bland (1760), 2 Burr. 1077 at p. 1082, 97 E.R. 717
at p. 720; Tye v. Gwynne (1810), 2 Camp. 346,170 E.R. 1179; Scott v. Gillmore (1810),
3 Taunt. 226, 128 E.R. 90; Solomon v. Turner (1815), 1 Stark 51,171 E.R. 398.
214 Warwick v. Nairn (1855), 10 Exch. 762 at p. 764, 156 E.R. 648 at p. 649. See also
Trickey v. Larne (1840), 6 M. & W. 278, 151 E.R. 414, 9 L.J. Ex. 141; Jackson v.
Murphy (188), 4 T.L.R. 92; Brown, Shipley & Co. Ltd. v. Alicia Hosiery Ltd., [1966]
1 Lloyd's Rep. 668 (C.A.); Fielding & Platt Ltd. v. Najjar, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 357, [1969]
2 All E.R. 150 (C.A.); Montecchi v. Shimco Ltd., [1980] 1 Lloyds Rep. 50 (C.A.).
215 Cf. footnotes 193-203 and text, supra.
216 Morgan v. Richarson, supra, footnote 213. Cf. also discussion as to English law in Reab
v. McAlister, 8 Wend, 109 (N.Y. Court of Errors, 1831), at pp. 116-17, and 0.
Barbour, A Treatise on the Law of Set-Off (Albany, Gould & Co., 1841), pp. 28-9.
217 Supra, footnote 213.
218 Barber v. Backhouse (1791), Peake 86, 170 E.R. 88.
219 Ledger v. Ewer (1794), Peake 283, 170 E.R. 157.
220 Cormack v. Gillis (Middlesex Sittings after Easter 1788), cited in Basten v. Butter
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This of course, strongly undermines the suggestion that the
inability to raise partial failure in a sum uncertain against a holder
not in due course on one hand, and developments with regard to
the availability of the defence of breach of warranty as well as of
unliquidated damages on the other hand, are unrelated.
Yet, even if seen as an independent rule, the holder's power to
recover over the defence of partial failure in a sum uncertain
appears to stand on a tenuous footing. Both grounds underlying
it, the "independent contract" and the "payment in cash"
theories, are in fact the two sides of the same coin. While the
former provides the cause of the holder's freedom, the latter is
the result thereof. It further appears that historically the "inde-
pendent contract" theory preceded the "payment in cash"
explanation 221 and thus the latter is in fact an aftermath rationale
to a rule which had already been perceived as existing. The
holder's power to overcome the defence of partial failure in a sum
uncertain appears then to be founded on the "independent
contract". In this framework, its applicability is governed indeed
by the contours of this contract. Thus for example, in Moggridge
v. Jones, a partial failure in a sum uncertain was overcome by the
plaintiff since "the money agreed ... would have been payable
immediately; but for the convenience of the defendant the
plaintiff agreed to take his acceptance at a future day". 222
Likewise in Grant v. Welchman, where a certain sum of money
was to be paid immediately but "the defendant's note ... was
taken as an indulgence to him", the court let the plaintiff recover
the entire amount of the note over the defence of partial failure in
a sum uncertain as "the whole consideration was then
payable".223
These cases establish a link between the express agreement of
the parties and the "payment in cash" theory. The link fits easily
into the framework of the accepted general rule under which an
agreement which governs an instrument is an equity affecting
it. 224 Yet if the holder's power to recover over the partial failure
(1806), 7 East 479, at pp. 480-1, 103 E.R. 185 at p. 186.
221 See citations in footnotes 213-14, supra. The "independent contract" cases were
decided between the turn of the 19th century and 1830. The first "payment in cash"
case is from 1840.
222 (1811), 14 East. 486, 104 E.R. 688.
223 (1812), 16 East 207 at p. 208, 104 E.R. 1067 at pp. 1067-68.
224 See footnotes 63-4 and text, supra.
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in a sum uncertain is based on contract, it should not extend to
cover situations where an actual agreement is lacking. Indeed,
the possibility of an "independent contract" implied by law
appears unwarranted, particularly in connection with standard
form contracts. In an era where the failure to point out onerous
terms in a contract may result in their unenforceability, 225 and
where a "most telling objection [for the use of negotiable instru-
ments in the sale of consumer goods] is that ordinarily the buyer
is not aware of the legal effect of signing a negotiable note",226 an
implied waiver of defence clause227 relating to an action on an
instrument which is unknown to the signer appears
unthinkable:228
... one [should always start] with the presumption that each party [to a
contract] is to be entitled to all those remedies for its breach ... including
the remedy of setting up a breach of warranty . . . . To rebut that
presumption one must be able to find in the contract clear unequivocal
words in which the parties have expressed their agreement that this remedy
shall not be available in respect of breaches of that particular contract.
229
Furthermore, even an explicit clause in a standard form contract,
225 See e.g., Tilden Rent-A-Car v. Clendenning (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 400, 18 O.R. (2d)
601,4 B.L.R. 50 (C.A.), and the comment by R. Hasson, 3 C.B.L.J. 193 (1978-79).
226 E. J. Murphy, "Another 'Assault upon the Citadel': Limiting the Use of Negotiable
Notes and Waiver-of-Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales", 29 Oh. St. L.J. 667 (1968),
at p. 671. The citation in the text relates to the waiver of defences against a holder in
due course.
227 Recall that the waiver of defences is final as against a remote party even when not
holder in due course, footnotes 186-92 and text, supra. As against the immediate party
the waiver of defences relates to the action on the instrument. It does not bar the
obligor from pursuing his remedy in a separate action against the immediate party;
footnotes 182-5 and text, supra.
228 Subject, of course, to the possibility of proving an applicable usage. "But then one
must be careful to see that one is not ascribing to the commercial world a custom or
habit which prevails only in a particular market or particular section of the commercial
world": Easton v. London Joint Stock Bank (1886), 34 Ch. D. 95 (C.A.), at p. 113, per
Bowen, L.J. Cf. in general, P.H. Clarke, "Incorporating Terms into a Contract by a
Course of Dealing", [1979] J. Bus. L. 23: The incorporation of terms into a contract by
a course of dealing is "through the operation of the rules of offer and acceptance".
229 Gilbert-Ash (Northern) Ltd. v. Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd., [1974] A.C. 689 at
p. 718, [1973] 3 All E.R. 195 at p. 216 (H.L.), per Lord Diplock, dealing with a
building contract. In this case the House of Lords specifically disapproved of a series of
previous decisions of the Court of Appeal (criticized by I. N. D. Wallace, "Set Back to
Set-Off', 89 L.Q.R. 36 (1973)), upholding the importance of "cash flow" in the
building industry and entitling contractors to recover in full notwithstanding the
obligor's defences. One of the disapproved cases, Frederick Mark Ltd. v. Schield,
[1972] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 9, 11 (C.A.), specifically used "a bill of exchange as a convenient
analogy".
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specifically pointed out to the obligor, may be struck out as one-
sided and unconscionable so as not to be enforceable. 230
It thus appears that failure of consideration, whether total or
partial, whether in an ascertained or liquidated amount or not, is
an equity as to liability on a bill or note and as such is available as
a defence to an action thereon by any holder not in due course,
whether immediate or remote party. Where the failure is partial,
it is available as a defence pro tanto in reduction of the recovery
by the holder. Orginal parties may agree to treat the obligation
on the instrument as absolute and not dependent on the
performance of the contract. The execution of the bill or note is
to be treated then as payment in cash. None the less, such an
agreement must be actual and is subject to ordinary controls on
contractual terms.
Conclusion
The Bills of Exchange Act, in the United Kindgom as well as in
Canada and other Commonwealth jurisdictions, falls short of
explicitly stating that a holder not in due course holds the
instrument subject to all defences available in an action on the
underlying contract. While this proposition is supported by policy
considerations it is reflected only in s. 15 of the Canadian Act
which governs the rights of a remote party holding an instrument
properly marked as given for a patent right. The proposition was
intended to have been adopted also in Part V of the Canadian Act
with respect to bills and notes issued by buyers of consumer goods
or services. 231
The delineation of defences available against a holder not in
due course in other circumstances turns on the scope of "defect of
title". In contrasting between "defect of title" and "mere
personal defences" 232 the Act follows the pre-Act differentiation
between an "equity attaching to the bill" and the "equities of the
parties". 233 On its part, the latter differentiation is modelled on
230 "Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unrea-
sonably favourable to the other party": Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
F. 2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), at p. 449. Cf. Arrale v. Costain Civil Engineering Ltd.,
[1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 98 (C.A.), at p. 102, even independent legal advice does not
always save the transaction.
231 See Part I, "The Statutory Scheme., supra.
232 See footnote 17 and text, supra.
233 See footnotes 127-8 and text, supra.
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the contrast between "an equity relating to the assigned debt"
and "a personal claim" which is "not connected with the chose in
action assigned". 234 Indeed, a negotiable instrument "is both a
chattel and a chose in action". Its ownership "involves not only
the right to possess a thing but the right to sue [thereunder]". 235
Thus, equities "relating to the assigned debt" as distinguished
from "equities of the parties" affect the title to a negotiable
instrument.
The comprehensiveness of the equities "relating to the
assigned debt" with respect to all "the terms and conditions of the
contract under which the indebtedness arose" 236 entails the conse-
quence that all defences arising from the underlying contract are
defects of title. This specifically excludes counterclaims arising
from separate matters, whether in liquidated or unliquidated
amounts. The subjection of an assignee of a chose in action to set-
offs of liquidated amounts arising from independent transactions
is an anomaly which is carried by the Canadian Act to the case of
an instrument issued in return to a patent right as well as to
consumer bills and notes. This anomaly neither turns the right of
set-off into a defect of title nor necessarily results in the
subjection thereto of a holder not in due course. 237
Pre-Act cases do not pronounce the proposition that defences
arising from the underlying contract are equities as to liability on
bills and notes. Neither this fact, 238 nor the unilateral nature of
the contract on a bill or note poses a serious challenge to the
heretofore analysis. "The laws distinguishing negotiable instru-
ments from non-negotiable instruments are not based on any
inherent distinctions between the obligations assumed in the one
class or the other of such contracts ... The content of a promise
[or order] is one thing, the development and recognition of a
defense is quite another". 239
Thus, failure of consideration, whether total or partial,
whether in an ascertained or liquidated amount or not, is an
equity as to liability on a negotiable instrument. It is available as a
234 See footnotes 129-30 and text, supra.
235 See footnotes 70-1 and text, supra.
236 See footnote 78 and text, supra.
237 See Part II, "Defect of Title., supra.
238 See footnotes 62-9 and text, supra.
239 See footnote 160 and text, supra, and, in general, Part III, "Equities as to Liability
.. ., supra.
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defence to an action thereon by any holder not in due course,
whether an immediate or a remote party. Where the failure is
partial, it is available as a defence pro tanto in reduction of the
holder's recovery. Cases holding against the availability of the
defence of partial failure in a sum uncertain are explained either
by their contemporary rules of common law which have since
then become obsolete or by the agreement of the original parties.
Yet such an agreement must be actual and is subject to ordinary
controls on contractual terms. 240
It thus appears that the proposition that a holder not in due
course holds the instrument subject to all defences available in an
action on the underlying contract is supported by policy consider-
ations as well as by a close analysis as to the nature of a negotiable
instrument and the concepts underlying the scope of liability
under it. While passing also a critical examination of the case law,
the proposition is, none the less, inconsistent with the prevailing
view on the scope of the defence of failure of consideration. It
might thus be unrealistic to expect courts to pronounce it. Legis-
lative intervention aimed at correcting the anomaly is warranted.
APPENDIX 1
Defences Available against a Holder Not in Due Course - The
Statutory Scheme Under the Canadian Bills of Exchange Act*
2. In this Act
"defence" includes counterclaim;
15. The endorsee or other transferee of any such instrument
having the words Given for a patent right so printed or written
thereon, takes the instrument subject to any defence or set-off in
respect of the whole or any part thereof that would have existed
between the original parties.
240 See Part IV, "The Defence of Failure .... , supra.
Can., s. 56(2) is U.K., s. 29(2); Can., s. 70(1) is U.K., s. 36(2); Can., s. 72 is U.K., s.
36(5); Can., 74(b) is U.K. s. 38(2). Can., ss. 15, 191 and the specific definition from
Can., s. 2 do not have corresponding provisions in the U.K. Act.
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56(2) In particular the title of a person who negotiates a bill is
defective within the meaning of this Act when he obtained the bill,
or the acceptance thereof, by fraud, duress or force and fear, or
other unlawful means, or for an illegal consideration, or when he
negotiates it in breach of faith, or under such circumstances as
amount to a fraud.
70(1) Where an overdue bill is negotiated, it can be negotiated
only subject to any defect of title affecting it at its maturity, and
thenceforward no person who takes it can acquire or give a better
title than the person from whom he took it had.
72. Where a bill that is not overdue has been dishonoured, any
person who takes it with notice of the dishonour takes it subject to
any defect of title attaching thereto at the time of dishonour; but
nothing in this section affects the rights of a holder in due course.
74. The rights and powers of the holder of a bill are as follows:
(b) where he is a holder in due course, he holds the bill free
from any defect of title of prior parties, as well as from
mere personal defences available to prior parties among
themselves, and may enforce payment against all parties
liable on the bill;
191. Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the right of
a holder of a consumer bill or consumer note that is marked as
required by section 190, to have the whole or any part thereof paid
by the purchaser or any party signing to accommodate the
purchaser is subject to any defence or right of set-off, other than
counter-claim, that the purchaser would have had in an action by
the seller on the consumer bill or consumer note.
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APPENDIX 2
The UCC Provisions**
§3-306 Rights of One Not Holder in Due Course
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person
takes the instrument subject to
(b) all defences of any party which would be available in an
action on a simple contract; and
(c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration
§3-408 Consideration
... Failure of consideration is a defense as against any person not
having the rights of a holder in due course ... Partial failure of
consideration is a defense pro tanto whether or not the failure is in
an ascertained or liquidated amount.
Reproduced for comparison and a possible direction for revising the statutory scheme
under the present Act. The overlap in the UCC provisions between "defenses ...
available in an action on a simple contract" and "failure of consideration" is explained
in B. Geva, "Contractual Defenses as Claims to the Instrument: The Right to Block
Payment on a Banker's Instrument", 58 Ore. L.Rev. 283 (1979), at pp. 296-7 and 301-4.
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